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ABSTRACT
Public key cryptography can introduce signiﬁcant processing
delays in vehicular communication platforms. This can lead
to serious performance issues, especially in the case of multi-
hop Inter-Vehicle Communication. In this paper we propose
Adaptive Message Authentication (AMA), a lightweight ﬁl-
tering scheme that reduces the number of cryptographic op-
erations performed by the nodes. Based only on local ob-
servations and with no additional communication channel,
our scheme achieves global improvement of network perfor-
mance. We show through simulation that the scheme suc-
cessfully adapts the number of cryptographic operations to
the locally observed number of adversaries.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection; C.2.1 [Network
Architecture and Design]: Wireless communication
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Security
1. INTRODUCTION
Current prominent eﬀorts to secure inter-vehicle commu-
nication (IVC) rely on well-established cryptographic build-
ing blocks such as public key cryptography and Certiﬁcation
Authorities (CAs), and mandate that all vehicular commu-
nication (VC) messages are digitally signed and carry the
certiﬁcate of the signing node (vehicle or Road-Side Unit
(RSU)). This way, the authenticity of any message can be
validated by receiving nodes.
Recent benchmarks [1] show that signature veriﬁcation on
a wide range of platforms takes signiﬁcant amount of time,
even for the fast elliptic curve algorithms. Due to on-board
vehicle equipment cost, the currently envisioned VC boxes
face the same limitations.
The solution we propose is an adaptive scheme which im-
proves the overall performance of a vehicular network by
allowing nodes to perform fewer message veriﬁcations. The
scheme takes advantage of the fact that nodes in diﬀerent
parts of network face diﬀerent security conditions at a given
point in time (Fig. 1). We verify that the reduction in num-
ber of message veriﬁcations does not make the network more
vulnerable to adversaries.
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Figure 1: A few regions in the city are under attack;
nodes in these regions actively defend. Nodes in
other areas can relax their security.
2. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
We deﬁne L to be the set of legitimate nodes. During the
lifetime T of the network, each legitimate node transmits at
a constant rate of rL messages/s. Let Ni be the total number
of legitimate messages received by destination i. Then, we
deﬁne the goodput γL as:
γL =
1
|L|
∑
i∈L
Ni
T
(1)
We consider two representative position-based forwarding
algorithms: the Cached Greedy GeoCast (CGGC) [4] from
the group of beacon-based unicast routing algorithms and
broadcast-based Contention-Based Forwarding (CBF) [3].
Security Assumptions. In accordance with the state-of-
the-art on secure VC [2], we assume that all messages are
signed with an EC-DSA and that the sender’s certiﬁcate is
attached to enable message validation (“message checking”),
i.e. certiﬁcate validation and sender’s signature validation.
Adversary Model. We consider adversaries that do not
have cryptographic keys certiﬁed by the CA. This implies
that they cannot sign on behalf of legitimate nodes. Their
goal is to reduce the goodput γL of legitimate nodes, by
injecting forged messages and making the legitimate nodes
waste their processing time on their veriﬁcation. All adver-
sarial nodes inject forged messages at a rate rA messages/s.
We deﬁne a as the percentage of adversaries in the network.
The adversaries are aware of a and choose their sending rate
rA in order to minimize γL.
Figure 2: Goodput γL obtained under AMA,“check-
all”, and “check-nothing” for the CBF algorithm.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND AMA
We deﬁne “check-all” and “check-nothing” as two extreme
approaches that can be applied to messages that need to
be relayed by nodes. “Check-all” is the default strategy in
the existing proposals. It assumes checking of each relayed
message. “Check-nothing” assumes that messages are not
checked prior to relaying (only messages received in destina-
tion zones are checked). As we can see in Fig. 2 “check-all”
is not the best approach for small percentages of adversaries
in the network and “check-nothing”becomes very bad as the
percentage of adversaries increases.
We propose Adaptive Message Authentication (AMA), an
adaptive scheme for authentication and integrity check of
messages exchanged between vehicles. Brieﬂy, an AMA node
can be in one of two modes: “check-all” and “relaxed.” A
node starts in “relaxed” mode. In this mode, a node checks
with probability 1 the messages destined for itself, but only
with probability p the messages destined for other nodes.
If it detects a forgery, the node switches to the “check-all”
mode. In the “check-all” mode, a node checks all messages
with probability 1, and switches to “relaxed” mode only if c
consecutive legitimate messages are received.
The rationale is that if a node senses that the current
“temperature” of the neighborhood is low, it can relay most
of the messages without prior authentication and keep au-
thenticating only a small fraction of messages in order to
ensure timely detection of security threats.
4. EVALUATION
Simulation Setup. We use SUMO traﬃc simulator and
SWANS network simulator. A population of 600 vehicles
moves in an area of 6 sq. km (Fig. 1). For the “check-
all” and “check-nothing” approaches we run 20 simulations
for every combination of a ∈ {0, 5, 10, 30, 50} and rA ∈
{0, 1, 2, 5, 10} messages/s. For AMA we run 20 simulations
for every combination of a, rA, and AMA parameters p ∈
{0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5} and c ∈ {20, 40, 60, 80, 100}. The le-
gitimate node sending rate rL is 1 message per second. The
CGGC beaconing rate is 1 beacon/300ms.
AMAParameter Selection. Having calculated γL achieved
under AMA for all combinations of the parameters (p, c, a, rA),
we now show how to select p and c to maximize γL. When
doing the selection, we have to keep in mind that the per-
centage a of adversaries is ﬁxed and that the adversaries
will learn the selected values of p and c, and choose rA to
minimize the goodput.
In the ﬁrst case, which we call pessimistic, we do not know
a. So, we select p and c that maximize the resulting γL
against the worst case combination of a and rA.
(p∗, c∗) = argmax(p,c) min
(a,rA)
γL (p, c, a, rA) (2)
In the second, optimistic case, we know a but of course
not rA. So, for the given value of a, we will choose p and c
that maximizes γL against the worst case reply rA.
(p∗, c∗)(a) = argmax(p,c) min
rA
γL (p, c, a, rA) (3)
In either case, the adversaries will choose rA to minimize
γL, given the legitimate users’ choice of p
∗ and c∗.
r∗A(a) = argminrA γL (p
∗, c∗, a, rA) (4)
r∗A(a) = argminrA γL (p
∗(a), c∗(a), a, rA) (5)
Performance Evaluation. Fig. 2 shows the goodput ob-
tained under the CBF routing algorithm (results for CGGC
can be found in [1]), with the average over 20 simulations
and error bars corresponding to one standard deviation.
Observe that the knowledge of a, i.e., the diﬀerence be-
tween the pessimistic and optimistic case, guarantees only
a slight performance improvement. In the pessimistic case
the goodput of legitimate nodes γL improves up to 30% for
CBF. The performance gain is due to the reduced number
of messages that are being checked by intermediate nodes
(it drops up to 46%). For comparison, the performance gain
in the case of CGGC is up to 33%, owing mostly to the
reduction in the checking of beacon messages.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrate that a simple, yet adap-
tive, ﬁltering scheme that allows nodes to judiciously decide
when to check the received message that requires further
relaying, and when to simply forward it without any delay,
brings signiﬁcant performance gain. Our simulations with
the state of the art in vehicular routing algorithms show
that, as a result of security overhead reduction, the goodput
of legitimate nodes increases up to 33%.
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